Persona: Senior Hardware Security Researcher & Automotive Systems Engineer

Target Review Group: This material is best reviewed by Hardware Reverse Engineers, Automotive Cybersecurity Researchers, and Embedded Systems Specialists. These professionals focus on ECU (Electronic Control Unit) exploitation, CAN bus analysis, and the creation of "bench setups" for isolated vulnerability research.

Abstract:

This technical brief details the successful construction of a "bench-top" Tesla Model 3 infotainment and autopilot research environment. To facilitate participation in Tesla's bug bounty program, a hardware security researcher acquired salvaged components—specifically the Media Control Unit (MCU) and Autopilot (AP) computer—from eBay. The project involved overcoming significant hardware integration challenges, including identifying high-amperage 12V power requirements (peaking at 8A), sourcing proprietary Rosenberger 99K10D-1D5A5-D display cables via full vehicle wiring harnesses, and performing component-level PCB repair (replacing a MAX16932CATIS/V+T step-down controller).

Initial reconnaissance of the booted system reveals an internal automotive Ethernet network using a static 192.168.90.0/24 subnet. Exposed services include an SSH server requiring signed certificates and a REST-like diagnostic API ("ODIN") on port 8080. The resulting setup provides a stable platform for exploring user interfaces, CAN bus traffic, and firmware extraction without the need for a physical vehicle.

Summary of Bench-Top Tesla MCU Integration

• [Context] Hardware Acquisition:
  • The researcher sourced a Tesla Model 3 MCU and Autopilot (AP) computer stack from eBay ($200–$300).
  • Components are housed in a water-cooled metal casing and include two layered PCBs: the MCU and the AP computer.
• [Requirements] Power Supply and Display:
  • A 12V DC power supply with at least 10A capacity is required; the system consumes up to 8A at peak.
  • A salvaged Model 3 touchscreen ($175) was required for UI interaction.
• [Obstacle] Proprietary Interconnects:
  • The display uses a 6-pin Rosenberger 99K10D-1D5A5-D connector.
  • Standard BMW LVDS cables are physically incompatible despite visual similarities.
  • Solution: Purchase of a full "Dashboard Wiring Harness" (Part 1067960-XX-E) for $80 to obtain the specific individual cable loom.
• [Technical Failure] PCB Damage and Repair:
  • Attempting to splice cut display wires resulted in a short circuit, destroying a power controller chip.
  • Identification and replacement of the MAX16932CATIS/V+T step-down controller restored the board to functionality.
• [Networking] Network Architecture and Enumeration:
  • The system utilizes an internal Ethernet network with no DHCP; researchers must manually configure IPs in the 192.168.90.X/24 range.
  • Host Map:
    • .100: MCU (CID/ICE) – Hosts SSH (:22) and Webserver (:8080).
    • .102: Gateway (GW).
    • .103 / .105: Autopilot (APE).
    • .60: Modem (FTP server).
• [Security] Exposed Services and Access Vectors:
  • SSH (Port 22): Active but requires RSA keys signed by Tesla. Root access is granted by Tesla only to researchers who prove a "rooting" vulnerability.
  • ODIN API (Port 8080): A REST-based diagnostic interface used by Tesla’s "Toolbox" software, providing a history of system tasks.
• [Key Takeaway] Research Capability:
  • The completed desk setup allows for safe, high-fidelity security auditing of the Tesla OS, user interface, and CAN bus communications in a controlled environment.